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II.
INTRODUCTION
A thorough Statement of Facts has been previously set
forth in Appellants' Opening and Reply Briefs and therefore will
not be simply repeated herein.

However, in relation to the

petitioner's arguments for a rehearing as set forth below, a
brief introduction is warranted.
Renae, a secretary for Charles Brown at Brown, Smith &
Hanna (BS&H) called Jim Luebcke at Progressive Printing for an
estimate on a printing project for a client, Mr. Gary Davis
(Davis) of William Cooper Winery.
$500.00.

The quote given was for

At a later date, Mr. Luebcke met directly with Davis,

who changed the order to a substantially different $4,000.00
project.

This was done without Charles Brown being present and

without his knowledge. (Trans. 22, 52, 57)

The trial court

realizing this found that there was no contract or meeting of the
minds between BS&H and the plaintiff after the original $500.00
quote had turned into a substantially different $4,000.00 order
by the client, Davis. (Trans. 74-75)
Therefore,

without

the

consent,

authorization,

knowledge, or contract (oral or written) of BS&H, Mr. Luebcke on
his own, contacted Mr. Johnson of Alphagraphics and placed the
$4,000.00 order so the majority of the work could be done by the
-ii-

plaintiff over the weekend.

Plaintiff realized at the time that

BS&H was not liable for the order.

It was very, very important

to Mr. Johnson to meet with Charles Brown Monday morning to make
BS&H responsible for the bill and not just the client. (Trans 67)
To

accomplish

this,

Mr.

Johnson

meeting with Jeffrey Brown

and Mr. Luebcke

(J. Brown) an attorney

arranged

a

at BS&H on

Monday, July 11, 1988.
In this meeting J. Brown testified that he never stated
that Charles Brown or that BS&H would be responsible

for the

order, but rather it was represented to him by plaintiff that
Charles Brown had already agreed to pay for the printing costs.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, claimed that J. Brown stated that
Charles Brown would be responsible.

It was undisputed, however,

that J. Brown never stated BS&H would be responsible
printing. (Trans. 54)

for the

Therefore, the only party who could have

been responsible for the order, after the Monday meeting with J.
Brown, would have been Charles Brown.
dismissed

Charles

Brown

because

The tria t court, however,

there was no

contract,

i.e.

meeting of the minds, for the $4,000.00 order (Trans. 74-75) and
there was no authority on the part of J. Brown to orally bind
Charles Brown to the order
however,

failed

(Trans. 75-76).

to dismiss BS&H

-iii-

from

the

The trial court,
suit, although

the

undisputed evidence is that J. Brown never stated that BS&H would
be responsible.
The trial court found rather that BS&H could be liable
by implication based upon the statements of J. Brown that Charles
would be responsible at the Monday meeting with the client, Mr.
Guy Davis being present and agreeing to this. (Trans. 76)

The

court further ruled that while there had been some attempt by
plaintiff to show a ratifying of the agreement by Charles Brown
from conversations after the work was finished, there was no
evidence of a retainer -although plaintiff indicated such in both
opening

and

closing

argument,

and

in no

sense

was

this

ratification of the contract. (Trans. 78).
The trial court, at the end of trial, erroneously found
that Guy Davis was present at this Monday meeting while the
undisputed testimony shows Mr. Davis was not present at the
Monday meeting (Trans. 25, 26, & 61) and the court found that
conversations
ratification

with

Charles

Brown

of the contract, after

was

an

acceptance

finding

conversations did not constitute any ratification.

earlier

or

these

(Trans. 143-

144)
On appeal, BS&H raised the argument that there could
not be an express contract between BS&H and Alphagraphics, based
upon the undisputed testimony presented at trial and furthermore,
-iv-

that the trial court's findings upon which it based its decision
against BS&H are clearly contrary to the evidence and the trial
court's

previous rulings

and constitute

reversible

error, and

should, therefore, be set aside.
This court, however, affirmed the trial court's ruling,
and

judgment

was

entered

on

October

25,

1990.

BS&H

now

respectfully submits to this court, pursuant to Rule 35 of the
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, the following points of law
or fact which were overlooked or misapprehended in its review.
Counsel

for petitioner hereby certifies that this Petition is

presented in good faith and not for delay.

III.
POINTS OF LAW OR FACT
OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED
A.

THERE WAS NEVER AN EXPRESS CONTRACT BETWEEN
THE PLAINTIFF, ALPHAGRAPHICS, AND BS&H.

Although Renae of BS&H called Progressive Printing for
an estimate of $500.00 for printing services, the trial court
found

that

there was no contract, i.e. meeting

of the minds

between BS&H and plaintiff as to the $4,000.00 order, since Mr.
Luebcke met directly with the client and the client substantially
changed the order without the knowledge or consent of Charles
Brown. (Trans. 73)

The trial court however, stated that this may
-1-

be overcome by the authorization of an agent of Charles Brown.
Plaintiff argued that the statement of J. Brown at the Monday
meeting, that Charles would be responsible, was sufficient to
bind Charles Brown to the order, but the trial court found no
authority by J. Brown to orally bind Charles Brown to the order,
Charles Brown was therefore dismissed from the suit.

(Trans. 75)

The trial court at this time should have also dismissed
BS&H

from the suit based upon the undisputed

evidence and

testimony on both sides that J. Brown never stated that BS&H
would be responsible for the order. (Trans. 54)

The trial court,

however, failed to dismiss BS&H but stated, without any evidence
being

presented

on the issue, that J. Brown had

apparent

authority to speak for BS&H and therefore could bind BS&H.

In so

holding, the trial court completely overlooked the undisputed
testimony of both sides that J. Brown never did state that BS&H
would be responsible for the order.

Based upon the undisputed

facts there is no contract or agreement that BS&H would be
responsible for the order.
contract.

Therefore there can be no express

To find an express contract the terms must be set

forth in writing or express words.

Bremerton Concrete Products

Co. Inc. v. Mylles, 745 P.2d 1338 (Wash. App. 1987); Eaton v.
Engelcke Manufacturing, Inc, 681 P.2d 1312 (Wash. App. 1984).
The trail court itself, in its previous ruling found that there
-2-

was no express contract with BS&H, but states that one can be
implied based upon the facts. (Trans. 77)

However, as set forth

below the trial court's implication of a contract between BS&H
and plaintiff is based upon inconsistent and clearly erroneous
findings of fact.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF AN IMPLIED
CONTRACT IS CONTRARY TO THE TRIAL COURT'S
PREVIOUS RULINGS AND AGAINST THE CLEAR
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND CONSTITUTES
REVERSIBLE ERROR.

In ruling

against

BS&H

the

trial

court

relies upon

implication and states that, while J. Brown does not say BS&H
will

be

responsible

individuals

nevertheless,

at his

instigation,

these

all meet in his office, with .the client, Mr. Guy

Davis being present, with no testimony of any response from him
as to my company will be responsible or I will be responsible,
rather J. Brown responds by saying Charlie is responsible, the
things which he says, while not express, implies that the law
firm is going to be responsible. (Trans. 76-77)

It was based

upon these facts that BS&H was not properly dismissed from the
suit.

At the end of the trial, the trial court found the law

firm liable by their actions, "by the implications, and by their
response after the merchandise was delivered..."
On

appeal

BS&H

argued

that the trial

court's

(Trans. 144).

findings

cannot

stand under the clearly erroneous standard based upon the clear
-3-

weight

of

following

the

evidence.

facts

were

The Appellants

overlooked

by

the

now

submit

appellate

that

the

court

in

affirming the lower court's ruling.
1.

Guy Davis was not present at the Monday meeting on

July 11, 1990.

The trial court based its finding of an implied

contract on the erroneous fact that Guy Davis was present at the
July 11, 1988 Monday meeting.

The court reasoned

"there's no

question but what in the meeting on Monday morning, he approves
with Mr. Davis, the nature of the work to be done." (Trans. 75)
the court went on further to reason "when the question is asked
who will be responsible with the client present Mr. Guy Davis
being present, and no testimony of any response from him as to my
company will be responsible or I will be responsible, rather Mr.
Jeffrey Brown responds by saying

'Charlie is f ... that response

the court feels, certainly would give the plaintiff's reason to
believe that the corporation is also responsible is this matter."
(Trans. 76-77)
Contrary to the court's finding and reasoning Guy Davis
was not present in the Monday morning meeting. (Trans. 25, 26 &
61).

Plaintiff, himself, admits that the court made a mistake in

finding the client present in the Monday meeting. (See Brief of
Appellee

p.

18).

Plaintiff

goes

on

to

argue

that

this

constituted harmless error, but based upon the court's reasoning,
-4-

it is clear that the court based its decision on this erroneous
finding, and in its absence there is a reasonable likelihood that
a more favorable result would have been obtained for defendant.
Therefore,
reversibie

this error
error.

(Utah 1983)

is not harmless error, but

constitutes

Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217

This finding is also clearly erroneous and against

the clear weight of the evidence and must be set aside.

Hardy v.

Hardy, 776 P.2d 917 (Utah App. 1989); Monrock, Inc. v. Sidwell,
770 P.2d 1022 (Utah App. 1989); Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d
84 (Utah App. 1989).
2.
ratification

The trial court previously ruled that there was no
of a contract

and no evidence or testimony

retainer being paid to cover the printing.
its

decision

against

Charles Brown saying

BS&H

upon

the

of a

The trial court bases

alleged

discussion

with

"well, we'll see if we can get some more

money, we weren't given a big enough retainer, et cetera. (Trans.
144)

This is after the court previously ruled "that there was no

testimony that the monies were to be paid out of a retainer fee."
(Trans. 78)

The court also ruled that there was no ratification

and that Charles Brown if he did attempt to get sufficient money
from his client, was acting only as a conduit to the client and
his actions did not constitute ratification.
court f s finding

that

(Trans. 78)

there was a retainer paid
-5-

to cover

The
the

printing and that there was an acceptance or ratification of a
contract by the defendants' actions after the merchandise was
delivered are contrary to the court's earlier ruling and are
against the clear weight of the evidence.

It constitutes

reversible error, in that it erroneously implies that BS&H was
responsible

for the work and directing the printing of the

material on behalf of the client and in its absence it is
reasonable that defendants would have obtained a more favorable
ruling form the trial court•

Harris v. Utah Transit Authority,

supra.
3.

The Monday meeting was not instigated at J. Brown's

request but by the plaintiff.

Another fact the trail court bases

its decision on is the erroneous fact that BS&H requested the
Monday morning meeting to meet with the plaintiff again with the
client present.

The court states, "while he does not expressly

say Brown, Smith and Hanna will be responsible, nevertheless, at
his instigation, these individuals all met in his office."
(Trans. 76)
The

evidence

is clear

however, that

it was

the

plaintiff who, realizing he had no agreement for the printing
costs with BS&H after spending all weekend on the order, called
Monday morning to set up a meeting with BS&H, to try and get BS&H
responsible for the order. (Trans. 61-62)
-6-

This fact was totally

overlooked by the trial court and if the trial court would have
realized this fact it would have lent support to J- Brown's
testimony that it was represented to him by the plaintiff that
Charles Brown had already agreed to pay for the order.
The above erroneous findings taken separately each
constitutes reversible error.

When they are considered together,

it is clear that the trial court committed reversible error,
requiring the reversal of the trial court's decision.
C.

ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED
WHERE ADMITTED ERRORS HAVE BEEN MADE,
CREATING AN ISSUE AS TO WHETHER THE
ERRORS ARE REVERSIBLE ERRORS OR NOT.

Recovery for attorney's fees under Rule 33 is provided
for when the appeal is frivolous or for delay.

A frivolous

appeal is one without reasonable or factual basis as defined in
Rule 40(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals Backstrom
Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).

A frivolous appeal is one without reasonable legal or

factual basis.
App. 1989).

Maughan v. Maughan, 102 Utah Adv. Rpt. 44 (Ct.

Under Rule 40(a) an appeal is not frivolous if there

can be made a good faith argument for the appeal.

This standard

is clearly met in this case.
Good faith arguments can and have been made for a
reversal of the lower court's decision in this case.

The record

is clear that errors have been made by the trial -ruirt. In fact,
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plaintiff admits that the trial court erred in its finding that
Guy Davis was present at the Monday meeting. (See Appellee's
Brief p. 18)

Although, plaintiff claims that this error was

harmless error, whether the error is harmless or not, is a matter
of determination on appeal.

A good faith argument can be made

that it was not harmless error, when the trial court actually
states that it found against BS&H based upon this erroneous
finding.

To award attorney's fees in such a case is too extreme

and will unjustly chill the appeal process.

This court, itself

held that sanctions for bringing a frivolous appeal "should only
be applied in egregious cases, lest there be an improper chilling
of the right to appeal erroneous lower court decisions." Poco v.
Poco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App. 1988).
Furthermore, the case at bar is not similar to other
cases where the appeal has been found to be frivolous.

In Barker

v. Emporium Partnership, 750 P. 2d 202 (Utah 1988) the defendants
failed to timely appeal the issues argued and thus the appeal was
found to be solely for delay.

Id. at 203.

In State v. Walker,

752 P. 2d 369 (Utah Ct. App 1988) the appellant failed to follow
proper procedure in filing the docketing statement.
wasn't dismissed, but attorneys fees were awarded.

The appeal
In Backstrom

Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, supra, the appeal was not taken
from a properly certified order, was not taken from an order that
-8.-

wholly disposed of the claim or party, but was one in a series of
many actions designed to postpone collection of a debt and
careful consideration under Rule 40(a) would have revealed these
defects.

In the case at bar, however, whether the errors

committed are harmless or reversible cannot be decided so simply.
In awarding attorney's fees in this case, the court is unjustly
chilling the appeal process.
IV.
CONCLUSION
There can be no express contract between the plaintiff
and defendant on the $4,000.00 order, as a matter of law, as
previously ruled by the trial court.
The trial court's finding of an implied contract is
based upon findings of fact that are clearly erroneous and must
be overturned.

Furthermore, in absence of these erroneous

findings, there is a reasonable likelihood that defendants would
have had a more favorable result, therefore, the trial courts'
errors constitutes reversible error.
Finally, regardless of the outcome, plaintiff should
not be awarded attorney's fees in this case, as this is not a
frivolous appeal.

Based upon the record

and

^imission of

plaintiff it is clear that errors have been made by the trial
court in this case.

Attorney's fees should not be awarded where
-9-

errors have been made and the issue is whether the errors are
reversible or not.
DATED this ^> day of November, 1990.

Budge W. Call
Attorney for Defendants
and Appellants
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